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1. Introduction 
Active trading in the market has received a great deal of attention among financial 
economists since investors seem to trade more that can be explained by rational market 
models. From the empirical determinants of trading volume, the overconfident investor 
behaviour is one of the behavioural biases that academia has modelled and tested to explain 
the irrationally high trading activity in the market. In the light of the recent financial 
instability in the European market and consequential financial regulatory changes, the 
changes in the trading activity of market participants is a current topic that may reveal 
information about changed market environment and investor overconfidence. These changes 
are not interesting solely from the empirical but also from the institutional point of view, but 
these determinants of the trading activity might be challenging to distinguish from each other 
in the empirical analysis. This thesis focuses on explaining the lead-lag relation between 
lagged returns and current trading activity and gives an overview of trading volume 
determinants in the European stock market in the 2000s. 
1.1. Motivation and background 
Odean (1999) states that research lacks models to determine what the equilibrium trading 
volume on the market is and agrees that the rational empirical determinants such as hedging 
needs and portfolio rebalancing are not sufficient to explain the excessive trading in the 
market. He tests the models in which overconfident investors trade more, and finds that those 
who trade most lose the most. Also the overconfidence models of Odean (1998a) and Gervais 
and Odean (2001) predict that overconfident investors increase their trading in the market 
after observing increased returns. This behaviour is due to the investors’ tight error bounds 
around return forecasts that causes investors to erroneously attribute high market returns to 
their ability to pick stocks. On the contrary, decreasing market returns make investors less 
confident and consequently make them decrease their trading activity. Based on these 
previous models, the overconfident trading behaviour is the central hypothesis analysed in 
this study. In addition to this hypothesis, there are also other empirical determinants that 
might explain the changes in the trading volume over time, and these are also presented 
briefly in the study. 
The models of Odean (1998a) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) provide 
testable hypotheses of the investor overconfidence including two general assumptions: 
investors overweight the precision of their private information in investment decisions and the 
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level of overconfidence varies with the observed market performance. The overconfident 
behaviour in investment decisions is related to the trading beliefs and market in general, 
rather than the attitude towards specific stocks or personal holdings (Statman, Thorley, and 
Vorkink (2006)). This supports the idea to study the overconfidence hypothesis merely with 
aggregated market-wide data instead of individual investors and their holdings data. So far, 
empirical research has not given much focus on the overconfidence, due to the lack of testable 
implications. 
In addition to the empirical determinants including different behavioural aspects, the 
trading volume is also affected by many institutional factors which may switch the trading 
activity between different trading venues and asset classes, and change the total trading 
volume in the market as well. Lately, the regulatory changes in the European financial 
markets have made market environment more transparent and fragmented, and this has 
affected the trading in traditional stock exchanges that are in the main focus of this study. 
Mainly the MiFID regulation and fast technical development of the trading venues have 
caused order flow fragmentation and a new type of competitive setup on the financial 
markets. The market fragmentation has also caused the trading activity to spread to not only 
new channels besides the traditional stock exchanges but also to alternative asset classes. The 
empirical results of this study are also related to these institutional effects and thus these 
effects are separately commented on. 
In this thesis, I focus on the lagged returns explaining the current trading activity in the 
European stock market and follow the study of Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) who 
study the potential support for the overconfidence hypothesis in the U.S. stock market from 
1962 to 2001. They find that trading volume is strongly dependent on the past returns for 
many months, and this finding is supporting the overconfident trading behaviour. My study is 
also time-series oriented and based on the daily observations of fourteen European national 
stock exchanges from June 2001 to December 2014. I apply the same methodology to the data 
on the monthly and weekly level, with the monthly level results as the base case in the study. I 
use the vector autoregression methodology and impulse response functions to obtain the 
relationship between lagged stock market returns and stock turnover. The indexes are mainly 
studied as a one panel but at some points they are also separately analysed and commented 
on. In addition, I divide the full observation period into two subsamples, from June 2001 to 
December 2008 and from January 2009 to December 2014, and these subsamples present pre- 
and post-crisis periods around the financial crisis occurred in 2008. 
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1.2. Contribution 
My contribution to the existing literature is to study the most recent relation between the 
past returns and the current trading activity in the European national stock exchanges. As 
mentioned, this is a way to study the overconfident trading behaviour in the market. The fresh 
data also enables me to take a closer look at this lead-lag relation before and after the financial 
crisis in 2008, and compare if the past returns explain the current trading activity differently 
during these periods. According to my knowledge this is the first study to statistically analyse 
the post-crisis trading activity broadly in the European traditional stock exchanges. Due to the 
recent regulatory events and market fragmentation in Europe, this study also gives unique 
viewpoint to the trading activity response to these events. For example, the market 
fragmentation caused by tightened regulation and new trading venues is still a new topic on 
the field and thus deserves more attention. 
The majority of the previous trading volume research is conducted in the U.S. market (e.g. 
Ajinkya and Jain (1989), Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1992), Atkins and Dyl (1997), and 
Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006)), and the regulatory differences and later observed 
fragmentation in the European market create differences in the market environment. I will not 
go into more detail in comparing the market environment in the U.S. and Europe but rather 
focus on collecting information and describing the changes obtained recently in the European 
stock market from the viewpoint of the traditional stock exchanges. Notably, the data covers 
widely the whole Europe and thus gives a comprehensive overview of the trading activity in 
the European national stock exchanges. 
1.3. Findings and limitations 
The main finding of this study indicates that overconfidence hypothesis also holds in 
Europe but not as strongly as in the U.S. shown in the previous study of Statman, Thorley, 
and Vorkink (2006). The second finding of this study shows that the overconfidence 
hypothesis has the strongest long-term empirical support in the traditional stock exchanges 
during the pre-crisis period from June 2001 to December 2008. The subsample covering the 
post-crisis period from January 2009 to December 2014 reveals contrary long-term results 
over years, as trading activity has constantly decreased despite the fact that the market returns 
have increased after the crisis. Despite these long-term differences in the subsample results, 
the weekly level study reveals that for couple of weeks, the trading activity actually follows 
the increasing returns during all periods, but the focus is still kept on the long-term results on 
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the monthly level. To find the explanation for these contrary long-term findings between the 
subsamples, I will describe the factors that have affected trading activity in the European 
traditional exchanges: market regulation including increasing market transparency and market 
fragmentation including new alternative trading venues and electronic trading in the European 
stock market. Due to the lack of academic research of the very recent market fragmentation in 
Europe, I will collect and analyse the post-crisis media insights concerning the decreasing 
stock trading volume. Also the effect of investor sentiment on the trading activity is 
separately studied. 
I acknowledge that there might be alternative explanations for these empirical results, 
which are interpreted here as a support of the overconfidence hypothesis, but following the 
previous literature and methodologies closely and finding the similar results gives additional 
support for the hypothesis. In addition, the clear difference between lagged returns and 
trading volume relation during the full, pre-crisis, and post-crisis periods make the topic 
interesting from the viewpoint of the prevailing market conditions. The post-crisis market 
confidence has been widely discussed in media and only lately the decreases in traditional 
stock exchange trading volumes have been traced to be caused by shifting trading volume 
instead of decrease in confidence. The limitation of this study is related to the time period that 
is affected heavily by the crisis period, and thus the longer term effects might not be 
witnessed in the results, and short-term results might be distorted. Furthermore, a larger 
amount of stock indexes covering also non-traditional exchange venues could give a more 
comprehensive view of the European stock market trading activity, since the market 
fragmentation effect might be diluted from the study. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I will review the literature related to 
empirical determinants of the trading activity in the financial markets with the main focus on 
the overconfidence theory. Moreover, I will give a brief introduction to the institutional 
factors affecting the stock trading volume especially after the recent financial crisis. In 
Section 3, I will describe the data and methodology used in the analysis. The section reviews 
the vector autoregression methodology and impulse response functions, as well as the details 
considered in the calculations. Section 4 presents the empirical results of the methodologies 
applied, first on the monthly level for the pooled market-wide level followed by a more 
detailed analysis on the stock index level. Also a weekly level study and investor sentiment 
effects on trading activity are presented. In Section 5, I present a qualitative study concerning 
the post-crisis market environment in the European stock market. The conclusions and 
suggestions for the future research are stated in the last section. 
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2. Literature review and hypothesis 
In this section I will present the previous literature related to the empirical and 
institutional determinants of the stock trading volume. First, the focus is on the empirical 
models and findings covering the overconfidence hypothesis that is testable with the lagged 
return effects on the current trading activity. Second, the institutional part gives attention to 
the stock market regulation and the recent market fragmentation in Europe. These changes 
have affected the trading especially in the traditional and domestic stock exchanges that are 
also in the focus of this study. 
2.1. Empirical determinants of trading volume 
Why do investors participate in active trading? In a perfectly rational world, there would 
not be any trading, but the noise caused by non-rational traders keeps the markets busy. Many 
studies suggest that private information drives different parties to trade, and under these 
conditions, rational traders are not willing to trade, since the traders with superior information 
would be the ones dominating the market. The first exit from the zero trading equilibrium was 
offered by Black (1986), as he was the first who argued that noise traders can overcome this 
equilibrium out of perfectly rational models. He argues that noise is created by expectations 
which make it difficult to form theories about the ways markets are working. More recently, 
Odean (1998a) and Gervais and Odean (2001) develop a model assessing noise trading and 
find that overconfident traders increase their trading in bull market, since they falsely attribute 
the value increase to their trading skills. In addition to the overconfident trading, Statman, 
Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) present alternative empirical motivations for active trading. 
2.1.1. Overconfidence hypothesis 
Odean (1999) studies a group of discount brokerage account customers and concludes that 
investors do trade too much and this is due to overconfidence. The study refers to Benos 
(1998) and Odean (1998a) who also state that overconfident investors trade more than would 
be optimal for them in a fully rational world and that this behaviour increases expected 
trading volume. They relate the overconfidence to overweighting the precision of their own 
information, as do also Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998). The latter developed a 
model to describe over- and underreaction in the stock market. The overconfidence is studied 
to be related to one’s biased self-attribution including tight error bounds and return forecasts. 
In their study, they summarise psychological cognitive evidence about individuals 
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overestimating their own abilities. They also add that overconfident behaviour is only 
triggered by signals received personally, not by signals publicly received by all investors. 
Odean (1998a) also gives a comprehensive overview to previous work related to the 
overconfidence hypothesis. In this study, I follow closely the methodology of Statman, 
Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) who find that lagged returns are able to explain current trading 
volume for many months. They study the relation on the index and security level and find that 
the relationship holds for both. 
With Finnish stock trading data, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) study overconfidence and 
sensation seeking trading behaviour. They find that these characteristics in addition to other 
behavioural attributes contribute to higher trading volumes, but they do not specifically find a 
relation between overconfidence and stock turnover. They state that “overconfidence is the 
tendency to place an irrationally excessive degree of confidence in one’s abilities and 
beliefs”. Behind this definition lie actually two separate interpretations, which are presented 
by Glaser and Weber (2004), who also found that market returns affect trading volumes. First, 
the miscalibration interpretation arises from tight error bounds around return forecasts, and 
the second interpretation is an idea that investors think their skills are better than average. 
This effect causes an investor to shift the perceived mean irrationally and for example De 
Long et al. (1991), Kyle and Wang (1997), and Benos (1998) conclude that these kind of 
investors may earn higher profits due to the aggressive trading with the first-mover advantage. 
The difference between these two types of overconfidence cannot be distinguished in this 
study, and Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) do not distinguish these in their tests either. 
But is overconfidence persistent or is it possible to learn to be less overconfident? Gervais 
and Odean (2001) note that overconfident investing behaviour decreases with time, but there 
are always new overconfident traders entering the market. They describe that overconfident 
behaviour does not lead to higher profits but greater profits lead to overconfidence. It is 
actually widely recognised that the more you trade the more you lose (e.g. Odean (1999)). 
Gervais and Odean (2001) show that greater overconfidence increases trading volume and 
that trading volume is higher (lower) after increased (decreased) market returns. However, 
these previous studies do not state any findings related to specific lead-lag relations between 
returns and volumes. There are also dissenting views about how overconfidence changes and 
persists over time, for example Griffin and Tversky (1992) state that experts are actually more 
overconfident than novices in a certain market environment.  
Related to the findings of Gervais and Odean (2001), I will test if increasing market 
returns lead to higher trading activity over time. The theory of overconfident investors 
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increasing and decreasing their trading with past returns supports the hypothesis, but also the 
alternative explanations for this relation are presented briefly in the subsequent paragraphs. 
2.1.2. Other determinants of trading volume 
It is widely recognised that rational motivations are not able to fully explain the trading 
volume and that some of the volume is clearly driven by behavioural motivations. There are 
also other behavioural aspects than overconfidence that have been modelled to explain the 
changes in trading volume. For example Shefrin and Statman (1985) present the disposition 
effect, which can also explain the changes in the trading volumes as investors are increasing 
their trading after realising paper gains. However, Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006)  
note that this effect explains only the motivation for the one side of the trade, and if large 
amount of trades is disposition related, pricing equilibrium might be distorted and new 
information is reflected slowly to the prices. In contrast, overconfident stock-picking is able 
to explain both sides of a transaction due to the differences in opinion and tight error bounds, 
and thus the transaction does not have to involve other liquidity traders or rational traders. 
The disposition effect is generally attached to investor’s beliefs towards a specific stock in 
his portfolio rather than the market as a whole. Nevertheless, an overconfident investor is 
likely to maintain his belief about stocks in general rather than an individual security he is 
currently holding. The difference between overconfident behaviour and disposition effect is 
nonetheless indistinguishable in the market-wide tests, since the high trading activity followed 
by high market returns can be a result from either of these two behavioural biases. In their 
study, Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) separate between these two by studying the 
stock-level trading volumes, and they also argue that market-wide aggregate data contain the 
best chance to find evidence of the overconfident investor behaviour. They state that if 
investors overestimate their ability to gain with active trading, they are likely to have this bias 
towards stocks in general. Partly due to this argument and the large number of different stock 
indexes included, I will not go into the stock level analysis in this study but rather focus on 
the index level analysis. 
Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) are the first to document a positive lead-lag 
relationship between returns and trading volume, and they also place other alternative 
explanations on explaining the changes in trading activity. Portfolio rebalancing, liquidity, 
tax-driven, and speculative trading derived from rational expectations model compared to 
models based on differences in opinion. These explanations are presented by Harris and Raviv 
(1993), and they believe that traders do have differences in opinion, even though they would 
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have the same information. For example, economists usually have access to the exactly same 
data and still giving dissenting statements. This behavioural bias is also related to 
overconfidence theory described previously, in which investor with biased self-attribution 
overweighs his own information. Due to the focus on the investor overconfidence, these 
alternative explanations mentioned are not studied any further in this paper. 
2.2. Other studies between returns and trading volume 
There are only few studies concerning lagged returns effect on the current trading activity, 
the subject of this study. The asset market literature has been more focused on explaining 
asset prices rather than volumes and has only recently started to produce results related to 
trading volumes (Harris and Raviv (1993)). Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992) studied stock 
price, volatility, and volume co-movement and find that price changes lead to movements in 
volume and that the effect is almost symmetric for both price increases and decreases. 
However, the paper does not relate the observed effect to the overconfidence hypothesis. 
Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) examine the pace of pricing the new information and short-
term interaction between volumes and return and find that trading volume is a significant 
determinant when the lead-lag autocorrelations in stock returns are observed. They conclude 
that trading volume plays a major role in reflecting new information to prices. 
In a few papers the subject of this thesis is studied contrariwise so that historical turnover 
effects on contemporaneous returns are observed. Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) 
study the short term high-volume return premium that is related to the visibility of the stock 
after a shock in trading volume (trader interest) and find that this premium holds. Cooper 
(1999) examines overreaction on individual securities and finds that historical volume is 
related to the direction of price trends. Chordia and Swaminathan (2000), Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000), and Llorente et al. (2002) have also contributed to the research of the 
volume and return relation, but most of the studies are not market aggregated but executed on 
the security level. In addition, a large amount of empirical research is related to 
contemporaneous turnover and return without considering the lagged effects, for example 
Karpoff (1987), Bessembinder and Seguin (1993), Bessembinder, Chan, and Seguin (1996), 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), and Lo and Wang (2000). Karpoff (1987) 
contributes to the research between price changes and trading volume and proposes one of the 
first models for studying the price-volume relation. The results in his study imply that this 
relation is the strongest at times when the information flow is most volatile. 
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Considerable amount of studies relate volume to contemporaneous return volatility, such 
as Karpoff (1987), Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992), Harris and Raviv (1993), 
Bessembinder and Seguin (1993), and Shalen (1993). The findings of positive correlation in 
these studies support to include contemporaneous and lagged observations of return volatility 
to the vector autoregression models executed in this study to control the analysis. 
2.3. Institutional aspects of trading volume 
The previous empirical trading volume studies are mostly focused on the U.S. stock 
markets (see e.g. Ajinkya and Jain (1989), Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1992), Atkins 
and Dyl (1997), and Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006)). The U.S. stock market has 
already experienced similar changes that have recently also become reality in the European 
markets and thus the comparison is relevant. The biggest market changes I will describe next 
are market regulation and fragmentation, which, in fact, are closely related to each other since 
the recent high speed of the market fragmentation is partly due to the new regulatory 
environment in the European market. The changed market environment is a rather new 
phenomenon and thus it is still lacking broader academic research. With this study, I 
contribute to this recent topic by collecting the information available about these changes 
from the viewpoint of the European national stock exchanges. The traditional stock exchanges 
are losing foothold in being the main market operators in domestic stock trading as new 
alternative trading venues appear to the market enabling the pan-European trading.  
2.3.1. European stock market regulation 
This study is based on the data of the European national stock exchanges, which are also 
considered as the traditional stock market operators on the field. Thus the trading activities of 
different national exchanges are heavily affected by the changed regulation in the European 
financial markets during the observation period from June 2001 to December 2014 (presented 
in more detail later in the data section). In June 2009, the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) published the report analysing the impact of MiFID (Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive) on the European equity markets. The time period in the analysis is 
only 18 months after the MiFID came into effect on the 1st of November 2007, and thus all 
the longer term effects might not be obtained on the report. 
Prior to the MiFID introduction, the national stock exchanges in Europe enjoyed good 
positions in the stock trading. The intention of the introduction of the new regulation was to 
increase transparency and accessibility in the market. The report agrees that the introduction 
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of MiFID has changed the secondary markets widely in Europe, but there might be also other 
drivers affecting the market than this introduction. For example, the market volatility on the 
observation period was extremely high and the financial crisis caused many defaults for 
counterparties. The original objective of MiFID was to increase competition among different 
trading venues, reduce trading costs, and increase the transparency on the market while 
supporting investor protection and market efficiency. This study also reviews how these goals 
are reached and which effects were not originally considered. 
2.3.2. Market fragmentation 
As a consequence to the tightened regulation in the European stock market, the new 
trading opportunities have risen for investors, and order flow competition between trading 
venues has increased. The national exchanges have been faced with several challenges after 
the introduction of the new MiFID regulation in 2007, but nonetheless the changes have 
caused mainly positive liquidity implications (e.g. Chlistalla and Lutat (2011) and He, 
Jarnecic, and Liu (2015)). According to the CESR report, MiFID classifies the trading venues 
explicitly into three groups: Regulated markets (in this study generally the national stock 
exchanges), multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) and systematic internalisers (SIs). The latter 
and all other types of venues are classified as OTCs (over-the-counter). The largest impact on 
the regulated markets trading have been caused by new multilateral trading facilities, which 
have attracted trading by having competitive fees, fast electronic trading venues, and enabling 
pan-European stock trading. MTFs have steadily increased their market share in all markets 
and the speed of growth has accelerated with the launches of new MTFs. However, it is 
important to notice that the majority of European stock trading still remains on the regulated 
markets rather than MTFs, even though the market share of the national stock exchanges has 
decreased after the implementation of MiFID. This is due to the limited trading between 
national stock exchanges and the shares that have been admitted to trading only to these 
specific exchanges. 
The CESR report also indicates that MiFID has indeed increased the competition among 
trading venues on the secondary stock market and increased the options for market 
participants to execute their orders. The fragmentation of the European equity trading has 
been acknowledged and studied by e.g. Chlistalla and Lutat (2011), Gomber et al. (2011), 
O’Hara and Ye (2011), and Menkveld (2013). At the same time, the trading fees have 
dramatically decreased and alternative markets have enabled the availability of narrower 
spreads (better prices) in the stock market. Trade sizes have decreased and number of trades 
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have increased, which, however, is most likely due to the algorithmic trading and market 
fragmentation rather than the MiFID regulation itself. 
According to the CESR report, the drawback of the MiFID introduction has been a 
decrease in overall market transparency and market data quality that has been observed also 
by Preece and Rosov (2014). IT costs have increased because regulated market players 
enhance their IT systems to reduce order latency and improve connectivity to compete with 
the flexible newcomers in the market. Also the overall trading costs have increased due to the 
decreases in average order sizes and increases in average execution amounts, even though the 
trading costs have dramatically decreased. Menkveld (2013) presents a new trader type, high-
frequency trader, who also contributes to ever fragmenting equity market. This trader type is 
also created by electronic and high-speed securities market, and thus the market operators 
having effective IT systems are able to attract high-frequency traders. 
In addition to the alternative trading venues mentioned, a part of the trading has also gone 
to the dark trading venues, in which the pre-trade transparency is limited (Preece and Rosov 
(2014)). Kwan, Masulis, and McInish (2015) study the market fragmentation in the U.S. and 
the competition between regulated markets and dark trading venues. They find that market 
fragmentation is speeded up by the difference in regulatory treatment since dark pools do not 
face similar constraints in stock spreads as traditional stock exchanges. It is also interesting 
how different investor types have divided their trading in different venues. For example, Zhu 
(2014) builds a model predicting that regulated traditional exchanges are more attractive for 
informed traders, and uninformed traders are more likely to trade in dark trading venues. 
However, this study does not take into account the separation between different investor 
types. 
Two years after CESR publications, in June 2011, the CFA Institute published a report 
(Preece, 2011) examining the European equity market and the regulation related to different 
trading venue types. The report suggests considerations for the MiFID policy and collects the 
observations since the introduction of new regulation. According to CFA, European equity 
trading is split in half between the OTC trading and trading in regulated markets or MTFs and 
that there has been no trend in this splitting from January 2008 to October 2010. The report 
also suggests that transaction sizes are getting smaller. This might be due to the increasing 
trade amounts as the trades are more often done electronically and also algorithmic trading 
contributes to decreasing trade sizes and increasing trade amounts. The CFA report concludes 
that, in all, the increased market transparency has been beneficial for stock investors. 
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Ticker Name
ASE Index Athens Stock Exchange 60 60
ATX Index Vienna Stock Exchange 20 20
BEL20 Index Brussels Stock Exchange 20 20
BUX Index Budapest Stock Exchange 17 13
CAC Index Paris Stock Exchange 40 40
DAX Index Frankfurt Stock Exchange 30 30
HEX Index Helsinki Stock Exchange 122 130
ISEQ Index Irish Stock Exchange 63 47
KFX Index Copenhagen Stock Exchange 20 20
MADX Index Madrid Stock Exchange 113 107
OMX Index Stockholm Stock Exchange 30 30
SMI Index Swiss Stock Exchange 27 20
UKX Index London Stock Exchange 101 102
WIG Index Warsaw Stock Exchange 112 382
Total 775 1021
Start date
1987-01-02
1983-12-31
1986-01-08
1990-12-31
1991-01-02
1987-07-09
Country
Greece
U.K.
Austria
Belgium
Hungary
Denmark
Spain
Finland
Ireland
Sweden
France
1988-07-01CHF
1991-04-16
Member count
Currency
EUR
GBP
EUR
EUR
HUF
EUR
EUR
EUR
EUR
DKK
14-Jan-02 30-Dec-14
1959-10-01
1987-01-02
1983-01-05
1989-12-04
1988-12-30
1986-12-18SEK
PLN
EUR
Switzerland
Poland
Germany
Table 1. Stock index details. 
Detailed information of the European national stock indexes included in the study. The increased member count is taken 
into account in trading volume calculations by measuring trading volume as a turnover ratio. The indexes are selected 
according to the price and volume data availability. The ticker names are used in retrieving data from the Bloomberg 
Terminal. 
3. Data and methodology 
In this section I will present the European market-wide stock index data and the 
methodology used in the study. Following Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006), I use the 
vector autoregression method and impulse response functions to obtain the lagged return 
effects on the trading activity and find support for the overconfidence hypothesis. 
3.1. Data description 
The study is executed on the stock index level and it contains fourteen European national 
stock indexes. These indexes and their details are presented in Table 1. The sample covers the 
indexes from the following European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Sweden, Greece, Ireland, United Kingdom, Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, Poland, and 
Spain, and thus represents broadly the European stock market. In the data collection, also 
other European national stock exchange indexes were discovered, but they were dropped from 
the study due to the limited historical data available. Some of the potential exchanges had also 
been established after the beginning of the time series in this study (i.e. after June 2001) and 
thus are excluded. All the indexes included are established in the exchanges during the early 
90s or before, and these market places can thus be seen as traditional stock exchanges that 
have long enjoyed their market shares on the domestic stock trading.  
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First in processing the data, I collected the observations of the daily index closing values 
(Bloomberg ticker: PX_LAST) to calculate the logarithmic daily returns. I collected 
separately the dividend yields and added them to the daily returns, which are used in 
calculating volatility on monthly and weekly levels. Second, I collected daily stock amounts 
traded in each exchange (Bloomberg ticker: PX_VOLUME) and the total amounts of stocks 
outstanding in each index (manually collected from the index Member Weightings, MEMB). 
The daily observations of stocks traded and returns are summed and used on the monthly 
level in the base case study. The data covers the period from June 1st, 2001 to December 31st, 
2014, and I retrieved it from the Bloomberg Terminal provided by Bloomberg L.P. The 
historical data time series is limited due to the stock volume data available (limited 
PX_VOLUME and MEMB data). The base case study is carried out on a monthly level, but 
weekly analysis is also executed and its results are presented and commented separately but 
not fully reported. Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) also focus on the monthly analysis, 
since the changes of investor overconfidence are likely to be more evident over long time 
periods. 
When examining the long-term trading activity, it must be noted that the number of 
outstanding shares of stock indexes has increased significantly. As Statman, Thorley, and 
Vorkink (2006) do, I also follow Lo and Wang (2000) and measure trading activity with 
turnover (shares traded divided by shares outstanding). I collected the data of daily stock 
amount traded, and the total stock amount traded in each index. The latter data was limited 
and it was not automatically available on daily basis. Thus the total amount of stocks is 
collected manually and adjusted on yearly basis so that the last value of each year represents 
the total shares outstanding every month during a year in question. The values of outstanding 
shares are adjusted for stock splits over time. The daily stock turnover is then calculated by 
dividing the daily amount of stocks traded by the total amount of stocks in the index. For 
monthly and weekly observations, the numerator is the sum of the daily stocks traded during 
each month or week. 
Figure 1 presents monthly index turnovers from the observation period for all fourteen 
indexes. Turnover level varies among the indexes across Europe and the growing long-term 
trend before 2001 is not observable in these graphs. However, it is still visible that the 
turnover series are nonstationary, and this leads to bias in the coefficient standard errors of the 
vector autoregression methodology used in this study. Even though the turnover is a relative 
measure, it has a trend over time. Turnover is always a non-negative measure and thus log 
transformation helps to eliminate the visual correlation between the turnover trend level and 
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volatility around it. With a log transformation, I am able to remove nonlinear trends from the 
data and reject the null hypothesis of a unit root using the Phillips and Perron (1988) test1. 
Despite the fact that the unit root was not found and thus the data could be used in the 
analysis without detrending, I will follow the methods and the following data modifications 
used by Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) to maximise the comparative potential of the 
studies. Thus I further modify the time series by using Hodrick and Prescott (1997) algorithm 
to detrend the turnover series2. Also simpler linear time-trend methods could be used in 
detrending, but they are not flexible enough in finding trends of various turnover patterns of 
equity indexes I examine. Figure 1 contains the dotted line that is a trend calculated from the 
log turnover series. The detrended time series used in this study is the monthly difference 
between log turnover and its trend. Detrending the turnover series might create a bias against 
finding the results supporting overconfidence hypothesis, since the realised returns may 
actually cause long-term trends in trading volumes. The VAR results of nondetrended 
turnover analysis are also observed, and partly reported and commented in the following 
sections. 
                                                 
1
 The Phillips and Perron (1988) test statistic for 14 indexes varies from -2.95 to -7.41 for log market 
turnover and from -7.00 to -12.51 for detrended log market turnover. The critical value of 5% for the test statistic 
is -2.89. 
2
 The Hodrick-Prescott (1997) algorithm minimises the variance of the raw series y around the trend to 
create the trend series s. The second difference of the trend penalises variations in the growth rate of the trend 
component. The filter chooses St to minimise∑ ( − )	
 + λ ∑ ( − ) − ( − )  	
 . The λ is the 
penalty parameter and trend becomes smoother when λ increases. I follow the common practice of setting 
λ=14,000 in monthly, and λ=270,400 in weekly analysis. Since the purpose of using the HP filter is to detrend 
the series and not forecast the trend, I allow the trending method to be two-sided, i.e. to use the data before and 
after time t in smoothing. 
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Fig. 1. Monthly turnover for 14 European stock indexes with trend line. 
This figure presents the monthly stock turnover for the 14 stock indexed included to the study. The turnover ratio is 
calculated by dividing the amount of stocks traded monthly by the total amount of stocks included in the index. The time 
period is the full observation period from June 2001 to December 2014. The index ticker names are presented in Table 1. The 
dotted trend line is calculated by using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) algorithm. 
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Fig. 1 (continued) 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the monthly market-wide turnover and returns in 
addition to the control variable, market volatility, for the full period sample from June 2001 to 
December 2014. The second part of the table also presents the subsample summary statistics 
for the two non-overlapping time series that are later used in examining the difference of 
results before and after the financial crisis in 2008 (pre- and post-crisis periods). The means 
and standard deviations (SD) of subsample turnovers are not very different from each other 
and this supports the rejection of the unit root in the series. However, I still also obtain the 
detrended log turnover for the time series, and their means and standard deviations also 
indicate stationary time series. 
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The two subsamples from June 2001 to December 2008 and from January 2009 to 
December 2014 are formed to test the effects of the recent financial crisis on the analysis. I 
also included a crisis dummy for the period of the highest return volatility during the crisis, 
that is to say, from October 2008 to December 2008. This dummy is not included in the base 
case study, since the results were not highly affected by the added variable. In Figure 1 there 
is not a large market-wide temporary change in turnover during the crisis, but it seems that 
after the crisis the turnover has constantly decreased in all countries included in the study. 
Nevertheless, this effect is contrary to the overconfidence hypothesis when compared to the 
market performance that has done quite well after the crisis (See Appendix A for the 
performance of fourteen stock indexes and their monthly return volatility (volatility) during 
the observation period). This post-crisis phenomenon is the main reason to use the two 
subsamples in studying the main hypothesis of overconfidence pre- and post-crisis. 
 
Table 2. Market descriptive statistics. 
This table reports the detailed statistics on the stock indexes included in the study. All values are reported in percentage 
points. Turnover is the monthly turnover calculated by shares traded during a month divided by outstanding shares at that 
time. Detrended log turnover (turn) is log transformed and detrending is done by using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) 
algorithm. Return (ret) is the monthly index return calculated as natural logarithmic change from the first and last observation 
each month. Volatility (volatility) is the French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) volatility measure based on daily 
observations and their standard deviations during a month. The first part of the table reports the full period from June 2001 to 
December 2014 and two other parts report the pre- and post-crisis subsamples, from June 2001 to December 2008, and from 
January 2009 to December 2014, respectively. The index ticker names are presented in Table 1. 
Period
Monthly obs.
from weekly obs.
from daily obs.
ASE ATX BEL BUX CAC DAX HEX ISEQ KFX MADX OMX SMI UKX WIG
Turnover
   Mean 5.01 4.01 5.48 5.49 10.85 13.44 5.56 4.50 3.86 15.31 9.82 9.23 10.22 3.85
   SD 1.90 1.62 2.45 2.11 3.08 3.72 1.53 1.54 1.33 4.85 4.17 3.62 4.98 1.54
   Minimum 2.00 1.51 2.20 2.32 5.24 6.62 2.83 1.78 1.64 6.47 3.53 3.60 2.90 1.51
   Maximum 12.64 10.28 14.42 12.96 22.82 32.91 10.10 9.71 9.51 31.03 20.47 21.83 20.05 10.20
Detrended log turnover (turn)
   Mean -2.19 -1.25 -1.64 -1.43 -0.93 -0.88 -1.12 -1.66 -1.02 -0.80 -1.09 -1.10 -0.79 -2.70
   SD 13.70 9.63 9.54 10.69 8.37 8.13 9.38 11.64 8.80 8.06 9.10 8.62 7.37 13.85
   Minimum -43.51 -22.67 -23.32 -29.40 -19.09 -21.79 -27.67 -29.26 -23.78 -24.28 -23.52 -22.54 -21.40 -30.79
   Maximum 34.9 28.3 27.3 33.5 27.1 31.3 28.0 32.9 27.7 23.6 24.2 24.4 18.5 39.2
Return (ret )
   Mean -0.47 0.62 0.44 0.72 0.26 0.68 0.30 0.23 0.82 0.52 0.67 0.45 0.47 1.03
   SD 9.04 6.82 5.56 6.81 5.69 6.65 7.26 6.33 5.56 6.06 5.64 4.46 4.50 6.63
   Minimum -31.07 -29.74 -21.67 -29.63 -18.20 -22.84 -22.33 -20.97 -18.98 -18.54 -16.37 -15.92 -14.38 -27.94
   Maximum 22.55 19.11 12.62 19.99 13.42 19.95 25.93 16.92 19.55 16.90 14.62 12.41 11.87 21.92
Volatility (volatility )
   Mean 7.78 6.09 5.24 6.39 5.66 6.03 6.71 5.81 5.29 5.90 5.84 4.75 4.45 5.61
   SD 4.06 4.13 3.60 3.89 3.59 3.71 3.64 3.81 3.18 3.38 3.42 3.26 3.05 2.89
   Minimum 2.29 1.68 0.72 1.63 0.43 1.64 0.76 1.24 1.42 1.42 1.23 1.04 0.34 1.28
   Maximum 28.25 34.49 25.52 37.30 22.46 23.21 19.27 31.13 26.58 25.05 22.60 23.20 21.76 21.69
Full period
6/2001-12/2014
163
709
3480
20 
 
 
 
Table 2 (continued) 
 
  
Period
Monthly obs.
from weekly obs.
from daily obs.
ASE ATX BEL BUX CAC DAX HEX ISEQ KFX MADX OMX SMI UKX WIG
Turnover
   Mean 4.51 4.23 5.41 5.18 12.34 14.93 6.03 5.23 4.31 17.65 12.61 11.28 14.21 3.90
   SD 1.51 1.85 2.55 1.72 2.87 3.51 1.56 1.29 1.48 4.92 3.23 3.24 2.35 1.69
   Minimum 2.22 1.51 2.20 2.32 8.17 9.54 3.40 2.43 1.64 8.18 7.23 6.06 8.08 1.77
   Maximum 10.49 10.28 13.89 12.96 22.82 32.91 9.73 9.71 9.51 31.03 20.47 21.83 20.05 10.20
Detrended log turnover (turn)
   Mean -1.48 -1.05 -2.25 -1.79 -0.29 0.07 -0.40 -0.94 -0.63 -0.50 -0.94 -0.26 0.06 -2.54
   SD 11.54 10.84 9.23 10.22 8.05 7.65 8.59 8.68 8.97 7.85 10.17 9.40 7.37 14.88
   Minimum -27.63 -22.67 -23.32 -29.40 -19.09 -17.18 -19.45 -21.10 -23.78 -22.51 -23.52 -22.5 -21.40 -30.79
   Maximum 26.46 28.32 26.88 21.55 27.06 31.33 19.52 22.76 27.71 18.68 21.79 23.45 18.48 39.24
Return (ret )
   Mean -0.33 0.56 -0.18 0.83 -0.42 -0.16 -0.50 -0.69 0.00 0.22 -0.23 -0.15 -0.12 0.78
   SD 7.72 7.00 6.08 6.98 5.72 7.00 7.99 6.76 6.01 5.49 6.18 4.62 4.36 7.20
   Minimum -28.62 -29.74 -21.67 -29.63 -18.20 -22.84 -22.33 -20.97 -18.98 -18.54 -16.37 -15.92 -14.38 -27.94
   Maximum 15.68 12.03 12.62 19.20 13.17 19.95 25.93 13.62 13.61 15.27 14.62 8.94 9.01 20.41
Volatility (volatility )
   Mean 5.93 5.38 5.32 6.38 5.62 6.21 7.27 5.75 5.28 4.96 6.29 5.13 4.49 5.88
   SD 3.54 4.52 4.20 4.35 3.95 4.12 4.02 4.41 3.54 3.30 3.63 3.77 3.45 2.72
   Minimum 2.29 1.68 1.42 1.81 0.62 1.94 2.08 1.24 1.80 1.42 1.82 1.04 1.05 2.05
   Maximum 28.25 34.49 25.52 37.30 22.46 23.21 19.27 31.13 26.58 25.05 22.60 23.20 21.76 21.69
Period
Monthly obs.
from weekly obs.
from daily obs.
ASE ATX BEL BUX CAC DAX HEX ISEQ KFX MADX OMX SMI UKX WIG
Turnover
   Mean 5.63 3.75 5.58 5.90 8.98 11.55 4.97 3.58 3.29 12.34 6.29 6.65 5.16 3.79
   SD 2.15 1.23 2.33 2.47 2.19 3.08 1.29 1.34 0.79 2.64 1.97 2.12 1.81 1.35
   Minimum 2.00 2.25 3.26 2.32 5.24 6.62 2.83 1.78 1.92 6.47 3.53 3.60 2.90 1.51
   Maximum 12.64 7.87 14.42 12.74 15.45 23.14 10.10 7.69 5.66 19.36 13.17 12.70 11.95 7.49
Detrended log turnover (turn)
   Mean -3.09 -1.51 -0.88 -0.97 -1.75 -2.09 -2.02 -2.57 -1.52 -1.18 -1.28 -2.16 -1.87 -2.90
   SD 16.06 7.91 9.94 11.32 8.75 8.60 10.28 14.57 8.62 8.36 7.60 7.44 7.29 12.51
   Minimum -43.51 -17.22 -22.35 -22.17 -18.96 -21.79 -27.67 -29.26 -20.98 -24.28 -17.35 -18.0 -20.14 -23.64
   Maximum 34.86 27.99 27.32 33.55 22.61 25.75 28.00 32.86 23.81 23.58 24.23 24.40 15.63 23.67
Return (ret )
   Mean -0.66 0.64 1.17 0.67 0.80 1.40 0.93 1.15 1.62 0.68 1.51 0.95 1.00 1.23
   SD 10.53 6.63 4.77 6.63 5.62 6.11 6.17 5.61 4.83 6.74 4.74 4.20 4.64 5.88
   Minimum -31.07 -18.87 -14.13 -16.14 -13.09 -19.01 -16.75 -15.81 -14.24 -15.67 -13.93 -15.01 -11.46 -16.82
   Maximum 22.55 19.11 11.94 19.99 13.42 17.41 24.49 16.92 19.55 16.90 13.97 12.41 11.87 21.92
Volatility (volatility )
   Mean 10.12 6.99 5.14 6.39 5.71 5.80 6.01 5.88 5.31 7.10 5.28 4.26 4.41 5.27
   SD 3.44 3.39 2.68 3.25 3.11 3.12 2.98 2.92 2.68 3.12 3.08 2.40 2.48 3.07
   Minimum 2.96 2.41 0.72 1.63 0.43 1.64 0.76 2.41 1.42 1.59 1.23 1.58 0.34 1.28
   Maximum 19.76 16.94 13.33 15.20 15.93 17.09 16.00 17.26 14.02 16.01 14.10 15.06 13.24 16.92
6/2001-12/2008
91
396
1943
1/2009-12/2014
72
313
1537
Post-crisis subsample
Pre-crisis subsample
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In the study I follow Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) methodology in which I 
explain the previously described detrended log turnover, turn, and daily market return, ret, 
with lagged daily returns and turnovers, and control the process with the volatility of the 
index, volatility, following the volatility measure of French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1986). 
Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) follow this same way of measuring volatility, but they 
also include another control variable, cross-sectional dispersion, calculated from stock level 
information. Since I will not observe the stock level data in my study, and there is not any 
direct volatility indexes fitting the data, I will leave the dispersion control variable out from 
the analysis. If used, the dispersion would control the potential trading activity associated 
with portfolio rebalancing which might be caused by large differences in the individual stock 
returns. The unreported analysis shows that the spreads have been rather stable during the 
fourteen year analysis period, only slightly increasing during crisis periods in 2001 and 2008. 
I will also include different sets of dummy variables into the analysis. In the monthly and 
weekly level study there is a dummy for each month during the observation period (163 
dummies) and a dummy for each country (14 dummies) to capture the month-, week- and 
country-specific fixed effects. Nonetheless, these dummies are left out from the final result 
tables due to the large amount of data. 
The stock turnover, turn, is used as a trading activity measure, and it is the detrended log 
turnover which is calculated based on the share amount traded in each index monthly. Market 
return, ret, is the monthly return including dividends paid on the stocks. Indexes are value-
weighted portfolios and all underlying stocks in indexes are included at all times. The 
subsample standard deviations for ret are stable and thus indicate stationary time series. The 
subsample means for ret are differing more, most likely due to the crisis that is included in the 
end of the first subsample. Only by dropping couple of last observations of 2008 from the 
mean calculation, the mean return increases to the levels of the post-crisis period mean. The 
turnover and return variables for all fourteen indexes are visualised on monthly basis in 
Appendix B. The trading activity measure varies evenly around zero and thus indicates that 
the detrending of the series has been executed properly. 
The reported control variable in this study, volatility, is the monthly volatility calculated 
from the daily returns each month, measured in percentage points. The use of volatility 
control measure is based on Karpoff (1987), who studied the relationship of contemporaneous 
volume and volatility. The volatility measure is similar to the one used in Statman, Thorley, 
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and Vorkink (2006) and it is based on French, Schwarz, and Stambaugh (1987)3. The control 
variable is correcting for realised autocorrelation, which is caused by non-synchronous 
trading of stocks. The return volatility increased temporarily during the crisis time, but has 
been rather stable at other times during the observation period. 
Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) use only a single large U.S stock index 
(NYSE/AMEX) in their study. Since I use data of fourteen separate smaller European 
indexes, my main study mainly observes the results of the panel data that pools all the indexes 
together. The monthly and weekly panels include 2,282 and 9,926 observations, respectively, 
and the sequential panel variable is defining the different indexes in the pooled analysis. After 
obtaining the results of the pooled data, I present the analysis of the separate indexes. 
3.2. Empirical methodology 
I will follow the vector autoregression and impulse response functions methodology used 
in the study by Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) to observe the lagged return effects on 
the stock turnover. Statistical analysis of the study is executed by using Stata 12 software. 
3.2.1. Vector autoregression model 
The general form of the vector autoregression (VAR) model is 
  = ∝ +  



 +  



 +  (1) 
where Yt is n x 1 vector of period t observations of endogenous variable, 2 x 1 vector of 
turnover and return in this model. Xt is a period t observations of the volatility, the exogenous 
control variable, and e is a n x 1 residual vector, 2 x 1 vector of turnover and return residuals 
in this model. Ak and Bl are the regression coefficients which estimate the relationship 
between turnover, return, and volatility. L and K specify the amount of lagged observations 
used in the model. In the VAR methodology, the contemporaneous correlation between 
endogenous variables, turn and ret, is captured since the residual vector e has a covariance 
structure. 
The amount of lags in the VAR model is the same than used in Statman, Thorley, and 
Vorkink (2006), that is to say, K = 10 and L = 2. These are determined by their data and the 
                                                 
3
 Month t volatility is calculated as  !"#$%"%$ = ∑ &'	'
 + 2 ∑ &'&'	'
 , where rτ is day τ’s return and T 
is the number of trading days in month t. 
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Schwartz Information Criteria (SIC). The selection is based on a log likelihood function that 
is adjusted by a penalty for the number of parameters. L = 2 indicates that contemporaneous 
and two lags of volatility variable, volatility, is used to explain and predict the endogenous 
variables. Notably, the lagged endogenous variables (K = 10) are starting with the first 
monthly lag, since naturally the current value is not taken into account. For comparison 
purposes, the same lag lengths are used when analysing the panel data and the data of separate 
indexes, even though SIC might suggest some variation for the optimal lengths. The weekly 
study that is not fully reported, but only partly commented on here, includes the values of K = 
24 and L = 8, since the main focus of the weekly analysis is to take a closer look at the first 
six months of the monthly analysis. 
3.2.2. Impulse response functions 
Based on the VAR model, I also execute impulse response functions (IRF) to visually 
illustrate how a shock in a residual et affects the current value of the dependent variable, turn 
or ret. The impulse response function traces the effect of a one standard deviation shock in 
one endogenous variable residual to current and future values of the endogenous variables. 
The complete equation of the bivariate VAR model illustrates the components of the model 
including the endogenous variables, stock turnover and index return, and the exogenous 
variable, stock index volatility: 
 )$*&+&$ , = )
∝-./
∝.0 , +  



)$*&+&$ , +  



 !"#$%"%$ + )
-./,
.0, , (2) 
In the impulse response function, the shock in a residual e will change the current value of 
the dependent variable, turnover or return. The shock will also have an effect on the future 
values of the dependent variables, since the lagged variables are also used as explanatory 
variables in the model. The main purpose of this study is to obtain the relation between 
current turnover and lagged returns. To test this hypothesis I use the impulse response 
functions and shock the market return residual, eret,t, by one standard deviation. Also the 
response of future turnover values to the shock in the current turnover is observed to study the 
turnover autocorrelation. Using the respective VAR model executed first, the impulse 
regression function output is a simple graph of how the endogenous variables are related after 
the shock. 
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4. Results 
In this section I will present the results of the vector autoregression analysis and the impulse 
response functions. The both methods are conducted for the pooled data of all indexes as well 
as for the single indexes, and the results are reported and commented on separately. The base 
case results are on the monthly level but also weekly results are examined. 
4.1. Vector autoregression results 
The vector autoregression is first executed to the pooled data including all fourteen stock 
indexes combined, followed by the more detailed analysis for the separate indexes. For the 
full period, the results indicate light support for the overconfidence hypothesis, and the 
subsample analysis reveals the difference in the relation between lagged returns and turnover 
when pre- and post-crisis periods are compared. 
4.1.1. Panel data analysis 
Table 3 summarises the results of the pooled bivariate vector autoregression between 
detrended log turnover, turn, and return, ret. The results are shown for the full period from 
June 2001 to December 2014 and for the two subsamples. The table is organised by three six-
column sets for the endogenous variables (turn and ret) and by rows for lagged endogenous 
and exogenous variable coefficients. For each coefficient, I report the estimated value 
(Coeff.), standard error (SE), and the p-value (p-val.). For clear table presentation, the 
significance levels are not shown on the table and all values are rounded to two digits. I 
generally refer to coefficients with p-values of 0.05 or less as significant, and coefficients 
with p-values of 0.01 or less as highly significant. 
For all observed periods, Table 3 shows that lagged turnover is explaining the current 
turnover, that is to say, that turn is autocorrelated with a highly significant first lagged 
coefficients of 0.37, 0.40, and 0.31 respectively for the full period and the two subsamples 
(with low standard errors of 0.02, 0.03, and 0.03). Hereinafter, the full period and the 
subsamples from 2001 to 2008 (pre-crisis) and from 2009 to 2014 (post-crisis) are referred to 
in respective order in this study. The turnover coefficients of the second and higher lags are 
rapidly declining in magnitude right after the first lag, and thus the strong autocorrelation of 
turnover persists only for a short period of time. The weekly analysis reveals that the 
autocorrelation is extremely strong only with the first weekly lag and diminishes drastically 
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already on the second lag observations for all periods. Figure 2 visualises the autocorrelation 
of the pooled data on the monthly level. 
To study the overconfidence hypothesis, the particular attention is paid to how the current 
turnover is dependent on the lagged returns in different observation periods. For the full 
period, the first lagged return has a significant positive effect on turnover, with the coefficient 
of 0.09 (with standard error of 0.04). Also for the both subsamples, the first lag of ret is 
positive, but these coefficients are not significant in the long-term analysis, and thus I 
separately analyse this effect on the weekly level later. However, both of the subsamples have 
significant second lag coefficients of 0.15 and -0.20. Moreover, other significant coefficients 
are positive and negative within the subsamples, respectively, meaning that before the crisis 
turnover increased with lagged returns, but this relation does not hold after the crisis. The 
positive and significant association between the turnover and lagged returns of the full period 
Table 3. Vector autoregression (VAR) estimation results, panel data, all periods. 
This table reports Coefficients, their standard errors (SE), and t-statistic significance levels (p-val.) of a VAR of detrended 
logged market turnover (turn) and return (ret), with 10 lags, for the full period sample as well as for the two subsamples, that
are summarised in Table 2. The VAR also includes contemporaneous and two lags of the exogenous variable return volatility 
(volatility), as described in Table 2. 
 
Coeff. SE p -val.Coeff. SE p -val. Coeff. SE p -val.Coeff. SE p -val. Coeff. SE p -val.Coeff. SE p -val.
rett-1 0.09 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.12 -0.05 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.32 -0.03 0.03 0.36
rett-2 -0.02 0.04 0.69 0.00 0.02 0.96 0.15 0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.61 -0.20 0.08 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.02
rett-3 0.00 0.04 0.97 0.02 0.02 0.29 0.05 0.06 0.44 -0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.08 0.53 0.07 0.03 0.04
rett-4 -0.09 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.55 -0.10 0.06 0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.54 -0.16 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.19
rett-5 0.02 0.04 0.67 0.00 0.02 0.88 0.19 0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.34 -0.12 0.08 0.13 -0.02 0.03 0.47
rett-6 -0.07 0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.02 0.29 -0.09 0.06 0.14 -0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.08 0.73 0.03 0.03 0.35
rett-7 0.11 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.03 1.00 0.13 0.08 0.09 -0.08 0.03 0.01
rett-8 0.01 0.04 0.85 0.01 0.02 0.67 -0.01 0.06 0.90 0.01 0.03 0.85 0.04 0.08 0.58 0.01 0.03 0.73
rett-9 -0.01 0.04 0.73 0.01 0.02 0.62 -0.01 0.06 0.82 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.50 -0.03 0.03 0.29
rett-10 -0.05 0.04 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.45 0.00 0.06 0.93 0.01 0.03 0.82 -0.05 0.08 0.51 0.05 0.03 0.14
turnt-1 0.37 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.83 0.40 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.31 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.61
turnt-2 0.02 0.02 0.28 -0.02 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.49 0.00 0.02 0.76 0.01 0.04 0.72 -0.02 0.01 0.18
turnt-3 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.58 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.79 0.06 0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.42
turnt-4 -0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.23 -0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.38
turnt-5 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.03 0.68 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.40
turnt-6 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.42 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.57 0.03 0.04 0.46 0.01 0.01 0.45
turnt-7 -0.01 0.02 0.51 0.01 0.01 0.37 -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.58 0.02 0.04 0.59 0.02 0.01 0.15
turnt-8 -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.16 -0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.10 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.14
turnt-9 -0.03 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.89 -0.01 0.03 0.78 0.01 0.01 0.51 -0.06 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.95
turnt-10 -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.62 -0.05 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.86 -0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.42
cons -0.10 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.10 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00
volatilityt 1.15 0.09 0.00 -0.33 0.04 0.00 1.01 0.12 0.00 -0.53 0.06 0.00 0.95 0.31 0.00 -0.74 0.13 0.00
volatilityt-1 -0.45 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.17 -0.27 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.16 -0.46 0.31 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.98
volatilityt-2 -0.36 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.05 1.00 -0.20 0.13 0.12 -0.01 0.06 0.89 -0.94 0.32 0.00 -0.22 0.13 0.10
turnt rett
Full period Pre-crisis subsample
turnt rett
Post-crisis subsample
turnt rett
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and the first subsample supports the overconfidence hypothesis and are similar to the findings 
of Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006). The second lagged return coefficient of the pre-
crisis subsample is significant and highly negative and it is followed by other negative 
coefficients. This reversed post-crisis effect is discussed in more detail later on the section 
including the separate post-crisis analysis. 
The coefficients of the lagged returns explaining the turnover on the monthly level are 
summarised in Figure 3, and they present the key finding of this study. The X (category) axis 
is presenting the observed time period. The leftmost columns show the coefficients for the full 
period from June 2001 to December 2014, the middle columns for the pre-crisis period from 
June 2001 to December 2008, and the rightmost columns for the post-crisis period from 
January 2009 to December 2014. The Y (value) axis is the coefficient magnitude and the Z 
Fig. 2. Coefficients, lagged turnover explaining turnover, panel data, all periods. 
This figure compares the coefficients between different lags of monthly turnover and samples in this study. The coefficients 
measure the effect of lagged turnover on the current turnover. Darker columns represent positive coefficients and lighter 
columns represent negative coefficients. 
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Fig. 3. Coefficients, lagged return explaining turnover, panel data, all periods, monthly. 
This figure compares the coefficients between different lags of monthly return and samples in this study. The coefficients 
measure the effect of lagged returns on the current turnover. Darker columns represent positive coefficients, lighter columns
represent negative coefficients, and all striped columns represent the coefficients that are significant at 5% level or less. 
(series) axis marks the monthly lags from the current value. The dark columns represent 
positive and the light columns negative coefficients, and all striped columns represent the 
coefficients that are significant at 5% level or less. The overconfidence hypothesis is 
supported by the significantly positive striped columns in the full and pre-crisis periods. 
However, there is a clear change in the relation of return and turnover when the financial 
crisis has passed, even though the first lagged return coefficient seems to be positive for all 
periods and this observation is analysed next. 
The first lag coefficients in Figure 3 for each period are positive and thus I observe the 
first four monthly lags also on a weekly level to see how these observations are formed. 
Figure 4 has the same chart area properties than Figure 3, but the lags presented on the Z axis 
are weekly lags instead of monthly lags. The weekly level analysis shows that there is a 
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significant positive relation on all periods between lagged returns and trading activity, and 
this relation last over a month until the difference obtained already in monthly analysis starts 
to show. This finding is supporting Statman, Thorley, Vorkink (2006) findings, though for the 
shorter period of time than they observed, and this finding shows significant support for an 
immediate increase in trading after the market returns increase. This finding supports short-
term overconfidence, and holds for all observation periods in the study. Approximately six 
weeks of lagged returns have a positive effect on the turnover during the full observation 
period. 
As in Karpoff (1987), Table 3 reveals the contemporaneous volatility to have a large and 
positive significant effect on the turnover that has coefficients of 1.15, 1.01, and 0.95. Lagged 
values of the exogenous variable must be interpreted with caution since the autocorrelation in 
volatility is widely recognised. Coefficient estimates are very sensitive to the number of lags 
included in the exogenous control variable, and here I follow the Statman, Thorley, and 
Vorkink (2006) and add the contemporaneous observation and two monthly lags. In the 
weekly study, the number of lags used is eight weeks. 
Fig. 4. Coefficients, lagged return explaining turnover, panel data, all periods, weekly. 
This figure compares the coefficients between different lags of weekly return and samples in this study. The coefficients 
measure the effect of lagged returns on the current turnover. Darker columns represent positive coefficients, lighter columns
represent negative coefficients, and all striped columns represent the coefficients that are significant at 5% level or less. 
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As is consistent with weak-form market efficiency, the dependent variable ret in Table 3 
shows that lagged returns or turnovers are not able to predict the contemporaneous return, and 
only a few small significant coefficients are observed in the results. For example, the first 
lagged turnover coefficients explaining return are not significant and very small 0.00, 0.02, 
and -0.01 (with standard errors of 0.01, 0.03, and 0.01). The similar non-significant 
coefficients explaining the subsequent returns are found in weekly study as well as in the 
study with raw nondetrended turnover. To keep the scope of the study in the main hypothesis, 
I focus on the results related to the lagged returns affecting turnover in the subsequent 
sections. 
I followed Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) by including the calendar month 
dummies for the full period panel data from January to December to the analysis. The results 
indicate that the trading activity is higher in the first trading months of a year and slightly 
drops during the summer months. These findings are not reported here or included in the base 
case study, since the inclusion does not affect any of the key findings. 
4.1.2. Single index analysis 
To get more detailed information about how the results presented in the panel data section 
are actually formed, Figures 5, 6, and 7 visualise the VAR coefficients on the index level for 
the full period and the two subsamples, respectively. The figures contain the coefficients of 
the fourteen separate stock indexes and the panel data (visualised previously in Figure 3) for 
turn as endogenous variable with monthly lags of ret up to ten months. The Y (value) axis is 
the coefficient value and, for the comparison purposes, these axes are scaled to have the same 
minimum and maximum values for each observation period. The X (category) axis presents 
the index in question, and the rightmost category represents the pooled data including all 
indexes. The Z (series) axis marks the monthly lags, and the first month is located in the back 
and the lags are increasing to the front, since the first lag is assumed to have the highest 
impact (largest coefficient) on the current value. The dark columns mark again the positive 
coefficients and the lighter columns the negative coefficients. The striped columns mark each 
coefficient that is significant at 5% level or less. To keep the scope, the single index results 
for the current return as a dependent variable are not reported here, but the results are similar 
to findings of Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006), supporting the weak-form market 
efficiency. There are no large differences between different time periods or indexes. 
To observe the results related to the overconfidence hypothesis, Figures 5, 6, and 7 
visualise how the current turnover is affected by monthly lagged returns. In the full period 
30 
 
 
 
graph, Figure 5, there are only a few significant coefficients, and all of the coefficients are 
smaller than 0.40. Only a half of the significant coefficients are positive. This graph hardly 
gives any support for the overconfidence hypothesis, not even an individual country shows 
any strong effect of turnover following the monthly returns. For the CAC, ISEQ, MADX, and 
UKX there are no significant coefficients, and the significant first lags are in ASE, DAX, 
KFX, and WIG indexes. The separate VAR analyses for the two subsamples reveal the 
difference between the pre- and post-crisis time that actually causes the larger significant 
effects for the full period to offset. 
  
Fig. 5. Coefficients, lagged return explaining turnover, single indexes, full period. 
This figure compares the coefficients between different lags of monthly return and indexes in the full period from June 
2001 to December 2014. The coefficients measure the effect of lagged returns on the current turnover. Darker columns 
represent positive coefficients, lighter columns represent negative coefficients, and all striped columns represent the 
coefficients that are significant at 5% level or less. The index ticker names are presented in Table 1. 
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In Figure 6 representing the pre-crisis stock market from June 2001 to December 2008, 
there are many significant coefficients and the vast majority of them are large and positive. 
Twelve of the significant coefficients are larger than the 0.40 that is the upper limit for the full 
period coefficients. However, the first lags do not seem to have substantially larger effect to 
the contemporaneous turnover than the later lags. Nonetheless, this finding supports the 
overconfidence hypothesis, as the current turnover is followed by increased lagged monthly 
returns. The ASE index shows the strongest support for the overconfidence hypothesis with 
three highly significant first lags. HEX, KFX, SMI, and UKX do not have any significant 
coefficients and thus the support for overconfidence or against it is not found. 
  
Fig. 6. Coefficients, lagged return explaining turnover, single indexes, pre-crisis. 
This figure compares the coefficients between different lags of monthly return and indexes in the pre-crisis period from June 
2001 to December 2008. The coefficients measure the effect of lagged returns on the current turnover. Darker columns 
represent positive coefficients, lighter columns represent negative coefficients, and all striped columns represent the 
coefficients that are significant at 5% level or less. The index ticker names are presented in Table 1. 
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In Figure 7, the second subsample representing the post-crisis stock market from 2009 to 
2014, the coefficients look completely different. The vast majority of the significant 
coefficients are actually negative, indicating reversed relationship between lagged returns and 
contemporaneous turnover compared to Figure 6. These negative values are observable in 
Appendix C with other index-specific coefficients and p-values since the 3D graphs show 
them only partially. The post-crisis finding of a large amount of negative coefficients goes 
against the overconfidence hypothesis, but this does not imply that there would not be any 
overconfidence in the market after crisis. Potential explanations for this post-crisis finding 
and decreasing trading volume are presented later. Notably, despite the large amount of 
negative significant coefficients, there are still six positive first lag coefficients, even though 
they are not significant. ASE index that previously showed strong support for overconfident 
trading during the pre-crisis period does not have any significant coefficient in the post-crisis 
analysis, and most of its coefficients are negative. BEL20 and OMX indexes show the 
strongest support against the overconfidence hypothesis, having four significantly negative 
coefficients during the post-crisis period. 
  
Fig. 7. Coefficients, lagged return explaining turnover, single indexes, post-crisis. 
This figure compares the coefficients between different lags of monthly return and indexes in the post-crisis period from 
January 2009 to December 2014. The coefficients measure the effect of lagged returns on the current turnover. Darker 
columns represent positive coefficients, lighter columns represent negative coefficients, and all striped columns represent the 
coefficients that are significant at 5% level or less. The index ticker names are presented in Table 1. 
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4.2. Impulse response function results  
As explained in the methodology section, Table 3 showing the VAR coefficients does not 
tell the complete truth about the impact of exogenous variable observations. All of the VAR 
coefficient estimates are used in the impulse response functions (IRF) to trace the impact of 
the shock in residual, which has a magnitude of one standard deviation. This way it is possible 
to trace the impact of each endogenous variable shock to each other, that is to say, how return 
shocks affect returns and turnovers, and turnover shocks affect returns and turnovers. Even 
though the VAR analysis output contains results between all variables and many impulse 
response functions could be obtained, only the effects of return shocks are presented 
thoroughly here. 
4.2.1. Panel data impulse response functions 
Figure 8 presents the impulse response function of a turnover shock affecting the current 
turnover for the following months, and Figures 9 and 10 present the impulse response 
functions of a return shock affecting the current turnover on the monthly and weekly level, 
respectively. All impulse response functions are executed after the panel VAR analysis, in 
which all the indexes are combined. The figures also show 95% confidence boundaries for 
each function. Figure 8 shows the effect of one standard deviation shock in turnover on the 
following months’ turnover values. The previously recognised autocorrelation is again visible, 
and the positive relation seems to last many months after the shock. The confidence interval 
of the function is very narrow and thus the size of the effect is known quite precisely. This 
relation is shown only for the full period and on the monthly level, since the findings are very 
similar with the two subsamples and on the weekly level. Due to the log transformation of the 
turn variable, the vertical axis of each IRF figure shows the percentage change in monthly or 
weekly turnover relative to the non-shocked value. For example in Figure 8, I observe similar 
results than Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006), as the turnover shock results 
approximately 3.0% increase in the following month’s turnover, and the cumulative increase 
during the following six months is 11.0%. The consistent results in turnover impulse response 
function imply that the sequential turnover patterns and behaviour are similar in the U.S. and 
Europe. Notably, the detrended turnover series forces impulse response functions to zero over 
time. The non-detrended and weekly level results are unreported, but indicate mainly positive 
and declining values for all 24 months before the effect dilutes. 
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Figure 9, Panels A, B, and C, shows the impulse response function graphs for the full period 
and the subsamples in the case of the return shock impulse affecting the contemporaneous 
turnover. The function is executed on the monthly level, and the first six months separated 
with a dashed line are shown on the weekly level in Figure 10. The function results are 
observed after the panel data VAR analysis for each time period. Statman, Thorley, and 
Vorkink (2006) find evidence for the overconfidence hypothesis from this analysis, and the 
findings here reveal similar results but with smaller effects. In Figure 9 the shock has a very 
small positive, less than 0.5% effect during the following month in all observation periods, 
and especially mild response over months for the full period (Panel A), since the cumulative 
six months effect is 0%. The pre-crisis period responses are clearly more positive in Panel B, 
supporting the overconfidence hypothesis with cumulative six months effect of 1.5%. The 
responses on the post-crisis period (Panel C) reveal contrary effects, as the cumulative six 
months response is -1.9%. This supports the previous finding that the overconfidence 
hypothesis does not hold strongly within European national stock exchanges in the full 
observation period, and that the pre-crisis period reveals more support for the overconfident 
investing behaviour than the post-crisis period. Later I will discuss possible explanations to 
this finding compared to Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006), who find very high 
accumulated turnover response to a return shock over the first six months. 
 
Fig. 8. Impulse response function, turnover response to turnover shock, full period. 
Impulse response functions with 95% confidence intervals. This figure shows turnover response to a turnover shock on the 
monthly level for the full period from June 2001 to December 2014. The shock to the residual eturn has a magnitude of one 
standard deviation. 
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Fig. 9. Impulse response function, turnover response to return shock, monthly. 
Impulse response functions with 95% confidence intervals. This figure shows monthly turnover response to a return shock on the 
monthly level for the full period from June 2001 to December 2014 (Panel A), the pre-crisis period from June 2001 to December 2008 
(Panel B), and the post-crisis subsample from January 2009 to December 2014 (Panel C). The shock to the residual eret has a 
magnitude of one standard deviation. The dashed line separates the first 6 months observations, and this period is shown on the 
weekly level in Figure 10. 
Panel A: Turnover response to return shock, full period
Panel B: Turnover response to return shock, pre-crisis 2001-2008
Panel C: Turnover response to return shock, post-crisis 2009-2014
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On the weekly level impulse response functions I analyse the return shock affecting the 
weekly turnover during the first six months, that is to say, 24 weeks. It should be noted that 
months are generally longer than four weeks and thus the 24 week period does not exactly 
match the six month period. Figure 10 shows how the turnover is affected on a weekly basis 
during each observation period. Interestingly, eight weeks from the shock the impulse 
response functions give very similar results for all observation periods. The cumulative 
effects of the shock on the weekly turnover are 2.35%, 2.10%, and 1.42% for the full, pre-
crisis, and post-crisis periods, respectively. The largest change in responses is shown from the 
week 9 to 16, as the respective cumulative effects on the weekly turnover are 0.00%, 2.22%, 
and -2.16%. These results are not directly comparable to the monthly impulse response 
function results, but the direction of the effects are the same from third week onwards, that is 
to say, positive response during the-pre crisis period and negative response during the post-
crisis period. 
Due to the scope of the study I do not present the impulse response function graphs for the 
response of the return to a one standard deviation shock in turn and ret. In these cases, the 
measured change is the difference in return compared to the average return. The overall 
results of all observation periods are not significantly different from zero, and the finding is 
consistent with weak-form market efficiency as in the VAR analysis where the current return 
is not explained by lagged return on lagged turnover. This finding is similar to the findings of 
Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006). 
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Fig. 10. Impulse response function, turnover response to return shock, weekly. 
Impulse response functions with 95% confidence intervals. This figure shows weekly turnover response to a return shock on the 
weekly level for the full period from June 2001 to December 2014 (Panel A), the pre-crisis period from June 2001 to December 
2008 (Panel B), and the post-crisis subsample from January 2009 to December 2014 (Panel C). The shock to the residual eret has a 
magnitude of one standard deviation. The dashed lines separate the 4 week periods’ observations from each other. 
Panel A: Turnover response to return shock, full period
Panel B: Turnover response to return shock, pre-crisis 2001-2008
Panel B: Turnover response to return shock, post-crisis 2009-2014
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4.2.2. Pre- and post-crisis impulse response functions comparison 
Due to the large amount of indexes in the study, there is also a possibility to test response 
magnitudes with different index combinations. To visualise the pre- and post-crisis difference 
more clearly, I collected a separate subsample of indexes that have a positive first-lag effect 
on turnover after a return shock during the first subsample period in the monthly level 
analysis. Appendix D shows the pre-crisis impulse response functions for the single indexes, 
and due to the large amount of indexes, the single index impulse response functions for the 
full period or the post-crisis data are not reported in this study separately. In other words, I 
study separately the countries having the strongest first monthly lag implications of 
overconfidence before the crisis and see how the effect changes post-crisis. The indexes in the 
sample are ASE (Greece), ATX (Austria), ISEQ (Ireland), KFX (Denmark), MADX (Spain), 
OMX (Sweden), and WIG (Poland). The impulse response function results of the pooled data 
of this rebuilt index list are shown in Figure 11. The figure shows how one standard deviation 
shock in return affects the monthly turnover before and after the financial crisis in 2008. 
Comparison of Panels A and B of Figure 11 confirms the difference in monthly turnover 
responses after a return shock during the pre- and post-crisis periods witnessed already in 
Figure 9. The cumulative positive effect during the first six months of the pre-crisis period is 
1.8% and over 5% with the upper 95% confidence bound. The values for the post-crisis 
period are -3.8% and -8.6% with the lower 95% confidence bound. This finding gives 
additional support for the results of the VAR analysis and impulse response functions 
executed for the sample including all fourteen indexes. The pre-crisis findings are interpreted 
as a support for the overconfidence hypothesis, and it is similar to previous findings of Odean 
(1998a), Gervais and Odean (2001), and Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) who find that 
overconfident traders increase their trading after observing increasing returns. The results of 
the post-crisis period are not giving implications of the overconfidence, and this effect is 
discussed in Section 5. 
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Fig. 11. Impulse response function, turnover response to return shock, subsamples. 
Impulse response functions with 95% confidence intervals. This figure shows turnover response to a return shock for the pre-
crisis period from June 2001 to December 2008 (Panel A), and the post-crisis subsample from January 2009 to December 
2014 (Panel B). The shock to the residual factor eret has a magnitude of one standard deviation. The both panels include the 
stock indexes ASE, ATX, ISEQ, KFX, MADX, OMX, and WIG. These indexes are selected based on the positive first lagged 
return coefficient explaining turnover. The coefficients are observed in the impulse response functions executed for the 
separate indexes for the pre-crisis period (2001-2008), and these functions are shown in Appendix D. 
Panel A: Turnover response to return shock in the panel of selected indexes, 
pre-crisis 2001-2008
Panel B: Turnover response to return shock in the panel of selected indexes, 
post-crisis 2009-2014
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4.3. Investor sentiment and trading volume 
There is only a limited amount of research conducted on the relation of investor sentiment 
and trading volume, but in their working paper Lei, So, and Zou (2012) find a positive 
relationship between these two. They state that noise traders should affect the market as they 
trade, and thus the trading volume should have a relationship with the noise. They use the 
volatility index VIX to measure the sentiment in the market, to assess the impact of noise 
traders participating in trading. Due to these previous findings I will also study separately 
how adding the investor sentiment to the original VAR analysis affects the results obtained. If 
the level of general investor sentiment gives additional information about the relation of 
lagged stock returns and trading activity, then adding the investor sentiment to the analysis 
should decrease the coefficients of lagged returns explaining the current turnover. 
Due to the lack of comprehensive European volatility index, I will use The Economic 
Sentiment Indicator as an indicator for the investor sentiment. The index is calculated from 
the European Commission’s Business and Consumer surveys and contains weightings for 
industrial confidence, service confidence, consumer confidence, construction confidence, and 
retail trade confidence. Figure 12 visualises the investor sentiment in Europe during the 
Fig. 12. Investor sentiment, stock market performance, and trading volume. 
Daily investor sentiment (EUESEMU Index) retrieved from Bloomberg: "The Economic Sentiment Indicator is calculated 
from the European Commission's Business and Consumer Surveys. It is constructed from the following indicators: the 
industrial confidence indicator (40%), the service confidence indicator (30%), the consumer confidence indicator (20%), 
the construction confidence indicator (5%), and the retail trade confidence indicator (5%)." For the comparison, figure 
shows the STOXX Europe 600 performance (SXXP Index). SXXP and EUESEMU Indexes are scaled 1.6.2001=100. 
Trading volume is aggregated from the daily turnovers of the 14 indexes by summing the equally weighted daily index 
turnovers. The turnover trend in the Figure is calculated from these values by using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) algorithm 
(with the penalty parameter λ=270,400). 
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observation period of the study. For the comparison, I also added the values of the STOXX 
Europe 600 index value, of which shape is close to the separate national exchange indexes 
included in the VAR analysis (shown in Appendix A). The values for the two indexes are 
retrieved from Bloomberg. The investor sentiment seems to follow the market performance 
very closely, and thus it might not provide any additional value to the analysis, since the 
change in market return with several lags is already considered in the main results. 
I executed the monthly VAR analysis for the separate indexes as previously but added the 
current monthly change in the investor sentiment index to the analysis with two lags, similar 
to the return volatility control variable in the base case model. Figure 13 shows the pattern of 
changes in the investor sentiment during the observation period. The changes in the investor 
sentiment also follow the return change pattern, and the same pattern is visible especially 
before and after the financial crisis in 2008 (see Appendix B for monthly returns). Notably, 
the average of the changes in the investor sentiment is very close to zero, meaning that the 
sentiment changes offset each other over time, since the investor sentiment cannot increase 
persistently. During the pre-crisis subsample from 2001 to 2008, the investor sentiment 
decreased 29 percentage points and during the post-crisis subsample from 2009 to 2014, 
increased 24 percentage points, returning to the levels of 2004. 
For the full period and both subperiods, the VAR R2 values remain almost the same, and 
the coefficients of the change in sentiment are not significant. The VAR results are not 
heavily affected by the introduction of the new variable, which implies that the market return 
itself is already including similar information about the sentiment in the stock market. This 
finding is supported for example by Brown and Cliff (2004) who find that past market returns 
are an important determinant of the investor sentiment and thus the sentiment is highly 
correlated with contemporaneous market returns. 
Fig. 13. Monthly changes in investor sentiment. 
Figure shows the monthly changes of the investor sentiment (EUESEMU Index) for the full observation period. 
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5. Post-crisis analysis 
In the light of the results presented for the full observation period and the two subsamples 
before and after the financial crisis, in this section I will take a closer look to the events after 
the financial crisis in 2008. Directly by comparing the previously presented Figure 1 turnover 
graphs with Appendix A index performances, one can see that after the financial crisis the 
trading volumes have drastically decreased in the traditional stock exchanges, even though 
these indexes have enjoyed market-wide increases in returns since 2009. Due to the changed 
market environment in the last decade, the continuous trading activity decreasing in national 
exchanges cannot blindly be blamed on the vanished overconfidence in the market, but rather 
on the changed market environment Thus as an additional part of the study, I will discuss 
briefly other drivers of the decreasing stock trading in the European national exchanges. 
The post-crisis downhill in the stock turnover is a rather recent phenomenon, and thus 
there are only a few authors to contribute academically on the issue. However, the topic is 
widely dealt with in media, and these media insights are analysed in more detail in this 
section. To understand the idea, in 2011, the Wall Street Journal wrote that multilateral 
trading facilities (MTFs) offering pan-European stock trading are shaking the positions of the 
national European stock exchanges. MTFs offer faster trading and lower costs and this has 
consequently made the incumbent market players to decrease their trading fees and upgrade 
their trading system technologies. In addition, the Financial Times wrote in 2013 that money 
on the European markets is allocated merely to cash and fixed income rather than stocks, the 
drought of mergers and acquisitions causes low volumes, and that low interest rates still 
favours the debt market over equity capital. Still in 2014, Reuters wrote about decreasing 
post-crisis trading volumes and revenues. 
5.1. Decreasing and shifting trading volume 
There are two possible explanations for the decreasing stock turnover that is seen in 
Figure 1. The first reasoning concerns the market as a whole and refers to the effects of the 
crisis on the stock turnover, and the second reasoning concerns the decrease especially in the 
traditional exchanges, due to the alternative trading venues appearing to the market. The 
detailed interrelation between the crisis, regulation, emergence of alternative trading venues, 
and trading volume is not analysed in more detail in this study, but I observe bilateral 
relations between some of these variables. 
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The increased regulation is a clear consequence of the crisis itself, and the alternative 
trading venues have increased their market share, as the new regulatory environment has 
placed new rules for trade transparency, and this has been done partly at the cost of the 
traditional trading venues. Figure 14 presents the annual value of share trading in the selected 
European stock exchanges before and after the crisis. The data include fourteen European 
regulated stock exchanges and it is collected from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) 
(It should be noted that the indexes are not the same than in the base case analysis of this 
study). The figure implies that the turnover in the National Exchanges has drastically 
decreased after 2008. However, when the trading in BATS Chi-X Europe is added to the total 
trading value of the traditional exchanges, the trading seems to climb back to its original 
levels. BATS Chi-X Europe is the first multilateral trading facility in Europe that received a 
status of Recognised Investment Exchange (RIE) in 20134. With these facts one can argue 
that actually the outlier may not be the decreasing trading volume we have witnessed post-
crisis, but rather the pre-crisis increase caused by the development of electronic trading 
systems. 
                                                 
4
 www.batstrading.co.uk 
Fig. 14. Annual stock trading value, full period. 
Summary of the value of shares traded in 14 European regulated stock exchanges in addition to the BATS Chi-X Europe, 
which is, since 2011, included in the data after BATS acquired Chi-X Europe. The data is collected from the World Federation 
of Exchanges (WFE) Annual Query Tool and includes all the European indices that are WFE member exchanges and have data 
available during the observation period. Notably, for this reason, the indexes are not exactly the same than in this study. The 
non-euro values in the original data are converted to euros using the annual average of each exchange rate retrieved from 
Bloomberg. Data source: www.world-exchanges.org. 
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The Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE) has been the first to publish the 
European Equity Market Report since 2008, after the introduction of the MiFID regulation. 
The report gathers data from all Regulated Market operators and Multilateral Trading 
Facilities which are recognised as FESE members in the European equity market. The report 
enables accurate comparison between trading venues in the terms of turnover on monthly 
basis from January 2009 to January 2015. On the report, turnover values are grouped 
according to the market type, Regulated Market (including traditional stock exchanges) or 
Multilateral Trading Facility. It should be noted that the largest decreases in trading happened 
already before the FESE data starts. Figure 15 presents the post-crisis development of 
European equity market reported by FESE, and the data is shown on a monthly level. Note 
that the BATS Chi-X Europe is categorised as MTF in the figure, even though it became a 
regulated market operator in 2013. 
The implication of Figures 13 and 14 is that the trading volumes tumbled due to the 
financial crisis and the total stock market volume despite of the exchange type. However, the 
recovery of the overall stock trading has not been seen in the traditional exchanges but rather 
in the alternative trading venues that have entered the market and increased their market share 
recently. Only in 2012, almost five years after the crisis, it seems that also the continuous 
decrease in the traditional exchanges has stopped.  
Fig. 15. Monthly stock trading value by market operator types, post-crisis. 
This figure shows the division of share trading value between regulated market operators and multilateral trading facilities in 
Europe. The data is collected from the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE). Note that as of 20th May 2013, 
BATS Chi-X Europe has become a Recognised Investment Exchange (Regulated market), but here it is included to MTF 
category for the whole period, since it does not represent the traditional stock exchanges in this study. Data source: 
www.fese.eu. 
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5.2. Media insights of decreasing trading volume 
Table 4 summarises chronologically the topics discussed in media about causes of 
decreasing trading volume after the financial crisis in 2008. The exact measures and 
definitions of trading volume in the texts are unknown, but it is assumed that the overall 
volume in traditional exchanges has decreased in all general volume measures and thus the 
results are comparable. I do not take into account here that some of the causes are closely 
related to each other, but the causes are picked only according to the wording used in the text. 
The texts are collected from the web pages of the publishers mentioned in the table, and the 
full reference list of the articles is shown in Appendix E. 
The table shows that the topics discussed over years after the crisis have regularly changed 
in the media. The majority of the topics appeared well after the crisis started, in 2012, when 
the media started to raise up the topics concerning lack of investor confidence and shifting to 
other asset classes from equities. Also unstable economic conditions appeared to the media 
after the long-standing European debt crisis. After 2012 the stricter regulation has not been a 
hot topic, but rather its consequence, off-exchange trading. 
“Traders are sitting on their hands” is a widely used phrase in the post-crisis media in all 
of its forms. The stricter regulation is appearing in many forms, for example, tighter capital 
requirements of Solvency II and Basel III are seen as a global response to the financial crisis. 
Credit Suisse report from 2012 is dividing the turnover affecting factors to seasonal and 
structural. The seasonal factors including equity allocation, active turnover, hedge fund 
leverage, and corporate activity are driving the volumes down even though structural factors 
such as high-frequency and algorithmic trading made possible by new technologies are 
increasing it. However, in the U.S., the structural factors are not able to increase the total trade 
amount. The huge shift from equities is explained by increased trading of equity futures and 
options, ETFs, and bonds, but large bond redemptions and lowering coupon payments are 
seen as a good thing for equity volumes. The decreasing volumes of traditional exchanges are 
blamed to the off-exchange operations, but also their volumes were slowing down after the 
crisis. The traditional exchange trading is maintained due to the fact that still many operations 
such as IPOs, secondary offerings and a range of derivatives trading are operated via them. 
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Date Publisher
07/2007 Bloomberg
10/2008 Traders Magazine
Traders Magazine
06/2011 BlackRock
10/2011 The Wall Street Journal
Bloomberg
04/2012 CNBC
05/2012 Reuters
08/2012 Credit Suisse
07/2012 The Wall Street Journal
06/2012 The New York Times
09/2012 Pricemetrix
01/2013 Financial Times
02/2013 Business Insider
The Economist
Reuters
MarketWatch
11/2014 Thomson Reuters
07/2014
10/2013
05/2013
05/2011
x
x
x x
x
01/2012
x
Causes of the low stock trading volume after the crisis
x
x
x
x x x
x
x
Stricter 
regulation
Lack of 
investor 
confidence
Shifting to 
other asset 
classes
Off-
exchange 
trading
Unstable 
economic 
conditions
Taxation 
issues
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Low M&A 
and IPO 
levels
x
x
x
x
x
x x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Table 4. Media insights of decreasing trading volume, post-crisis. 
Table shows in chronological order the topics discussed in media concerning the decreasing stock trading volume after the 
financial crisis. The texts are collected via Google Search (www.google.com). See the full list of reference in Appendix E. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
Academia has widely agreed that the trading volume witnessed in the markets cannot be 
justified by rational motives such as portfolio rebalancing or hedging needs. The trading 
activity changes not only with different rational and behavioural empirical factors but also 
with institutional determinants. The one part of the empirical research has tried to find a 
relation between market performance and trading activity. The formalised theories of investor 
overconfidence have recently tried to explain overconfident investor behaviour associated 
with market performance. Research has created a proposition that investors become 
overconfident after increasing market returns and increase their trading activity. This 
behaviour is due to the investors associating the higher returns to their abilities to pick stocks. 
Contrarily, decreasing market returns make investors less confident and consequently make 
them decrease trading. So far, empirical research has not presented a lot of testable 
implications to the overconfidence hypothesis, and thus there is only little empirical research 
about the topic. The overconfidence models have been presented for example by Odean 
(1998a), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Gervais and Odean (2001). The 
overconfidence hypothesis is tested for example in Odean (1999) and Statman, Thorley, and 
Vorkink (2006). 
This study contributes to the previous research by testing the overconfidence hypothesis in 
Europe with the most recent data available. The study follows closely Statman, Thorley, and 
Vorkink (2006) who test the overconfidence hypothesis in the U.S. stock market. Also other 
volume studies are mostly focused on the U.S. market (see e.g. Ajinkya and Jain (1989), 
Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1992), and Atkins and Dyl (1997)), and thus I contribute to 
the existing literature by studying how the hypothesis holds on the European stock market that 
has experienced great changes during the observation period from June 2001 to December 
2014. The full observation period is analysed in the study, but I also divide it into two 
subsamples to obtain the difference in the market before and after the financial crisis in 2008. 
The data set includes market returns and trading turnovers of fourteen European national 
stock exchange indexes. The overconfidence hypothesis is tested in this study by using the 
vector autoregression (VAR) method and impulse response functions (IRF), which require the 
VAR method conducted beforehand. The pooled data set of all fourteen indexes is analysed 
separately, and more detailed analysis for separate indexes is also done in both parts of the 
methodology. 
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The main finding of this study is that the overconfidence hypothesis holds in the European 
stock market, that is to say, the investors increase (decrease) their trading after observing 
higher (lower) market returns. However, this relation holds only during the pre-crisis period, 
from 2001 to 2008, and the support for the hypothesis is not found in the post-crisis 
subsample from 2009 to 2014. As a matter of fact, the trading volume has drastically 
decreased in traditional stock exchanges included in the study after the financial crisis, 
although the market performance has recovered after the crisis. The post-crisis volume 
decrease has slowed down only for couple of years now. The weekly level study reveals that 
on the short-term, approximately six weeks, the positive relation holds for all observation 
periods. The long-term support for the overconfidence during the pre-crisis period is similar 
to the findings of Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) and the findings also confirm the 
models of Odean (1998a) and Gervais and Odean (2001) who find that overconfident traders 
increase their trading after observing increased returns. 
Due to the recency of these post-crisis market events and the scope of the study, I do not 
empirically test the causes of the decreasing trading volume after the crisis, but I present 
recent statistics and media insights related to the European stock trading during the post-crisis 
period. The two main explanations for the decreasing trading volume in the traditional stock 
exchanges are market regulation and market fragmentation. The MiFID regulation has 
enabled the market fragmentation by increasingly allocating the order flow to alternative 
trading venues, the so called multilateral trading facilities that have enabled pan-European 
stock trading with fast electronic trading solutions. Recently, the media has highlighted that 
the decreasing trading volume is also caused by switching the asset classes away from direct 
stocks to e.g. bonds, ETFs, and equity derivatives. 
Although this study is motivated by the theories of overconfidence, there is clear empirical 
evidence supporting these theories that should be acknowledged. There might also be other 
factors explaining trading activity following the past returns in the stock market, and the 
distinction between these explanations might be subjective. The findings of this study suggest 
that further development and empirical research may be allocated to study the regulation and 
market fragmentation effects on the trading activity. The market fragmentation effect might 
also be diluted if the sample in the analysis included also trading data of alternative trading 
venues. Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate which investor types are most 
affected by the new market environment, i.e. who is most likely to switch trading away from 
the traditional trading venues. 
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Appendix A. Index performance and return volatility 
 
Performance of 14 European stock indexes with monthly return volatility calculated from daily returns. 
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Appendix A continued 
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Appendix B. Monthly detrended log turnover and index return 
 
 
Variables turn and ret visualised for all 14 indexes included in the VAR analysis of single indexes. 
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Appendix B continued 
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Appendix C. VAR results for separate indexes 
 
 
VAR coefficients and p-values of single indexes, all periods. 
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Appendix D. Pre-crisis impulse response functions for single indexes 
 
 
Impulse response functions with 95% confidence interval, turnover response to return shock, pre-crisis subsample 
from June 2001 to December 2008. 
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Appendix D continued 
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Appendix E. Table of media insights 
 
 
Reference list for the media insights, alphabetical order by the publisher. 
Year Retrieved from
2011 www.blackrock.com
2007 www.bloomberg.com
2012 www.bloomberg.com
2013 www.businessinsider.com
2012 www.cnbc.com
2012 www.credit-suisse.com
2013 www.ft.com
2014 www.marketwatch.com
2012 www.pricemetrix.com
2012 www.wallstreetandtech.com
2013 www.reuters.com
2013 www.economist.com
2012 www.nytimes.com
2011 www.wsj.com
2012 www.wsj.com
2014 www.reuters.com
2008 www.tradersmagazine.com
2011 www.tradersmagazine.comRamage, J.
Reklaitis, V. and Mahmudova, A. 
-
Scott, M.
Stevenson, A.
-
Wang, L., Nagi, C., and Baker, N.
CNBC
The Wall Street Journal
The New York Times
Pricemetrix
Traders Magazine
MarketWatch
Reuters
Bloomberg
Financial Times
The Economist
Bloomberg
Boesler, M.
Chapman, P.
Cruise, S. and Jessop, S.
Dunkley, E.
Laurent, L.
Mackintosh, P. and Casciano, S.
TitlePublisher
BlackRock
Business Insider
Traders Magazine
Reuters
The Wall Street Journal
Thomson Reuters
Credit Suisse
Writer
Stock Trading is Still Falling 
After '08 Crisis
Decreasing Year-Over-Year 
Trade Volume - Fact Or 
Fantasy
-
Melloy, J.
Phillips, M. and Cheng, J.
Popper, N.
-
No Changes to Dark Pools: 
Buyside
Why Trading Volume is 
Tumbling, Explained in 5 
Charts
Share Volume to Stay Low as 
Euro Crisis Hits Industry
Online Trading Blooms in 
Europe
European Stocks Trade 
Volumes Slump
Going Broke in Stocks
Stock Trading Lowest in U.S. 
since 2008 Amid Fund 
Withdrawals
Equity Market Trading in 
Europe: The Case for 
Refinement Over Revolution
GOLDMAN: Here's Where 
all the S&P 500 Trading 
Volume Went
Gunning for the Old Guard
Dark Pool Stock Trading 
Picks Up as Europe Debates 
New Curbs
Pan-Europe Vs. the Nationals
Europe Stock-Trading 
Revenue Likely to Fall in 2014-
Report
Where has all the Trading 
Gone?
Where has all the Trading 
Gone? Volume Hits 4-Year 
Low
Traders Tune Out Noise from 
Europe
